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Abstract 
The concentration of personal wealth is now receiving a great deal of attention – after having 
been neglected for many years.  One reason is the growing recognition that, in seeking 
explanations for rising income inequality, we need to look not only at wages and earned 
income but also at income from capital, particularly at the top of the distribution. In this paper, 
we use evidence from existing data sources to attempt to answer three questions: (i) what is 
the share of total personal wealth that is owned by the top 1 per cent, or the top 0.1 per cent? 
(ii) is wealth much more unequally distributed than income? (iii) is the concentration of wealth 
at the top increasing over time? The main conclusion of the paper is that the evidence about 
the UK concentration of wealth post-2000 is seriously incomplete and significant investment 
in a variety of sources is necessary if we are to provide satisfactory answers to the three 
questions. 
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1. Wealth inequality under the spotlight 
The distribution of personal wealth is now receiving a great deal of attention – after having 
been neglected for many years.  One reason is the growing recognition that, in seeking 
explanations for rising income inequality, we need to look not only at wages and earned 
income but also at income from capital. Income from interest, from dividends, and from rents 
represents a minority of total personal income, but it is nonetheless a significant part, in 
particular, at the top of the distribution. Moreover, viewed from the side of national accounts, 
the share of income from capital and rents has been increasing in recent decades. In many 
OECD countries, the ratio of total personal wealth to total personal income has been rising.  
One consequence is that the role of inherited wealth – declining for much of the twentieth 
century – has, in a number of countries, begun to acquire greater significance. 
The recent attention to the distribution of wealth has led to evidence being sought on several 
key questions. The first is the extent of concentration of wealth at the top. What is the share 
of total personal wealth that is owned by the top 1 per cent, or by even smaller groups such 
as the top 0.1 per cent?  The second is whether wealth is much more unequally distributed 
than income.  The OECD report, In it together, stresses that “household wealth – in particular 
financial assets – is much more unequally distributed than income” (2015, page 34). The third 
key question is whether wealth inequality is increasing over time.  The OECD report says of 
the United Kingdom that “the financial crisis has exacerbated the concentration of wealth at 
the top” (page 241). How far is wealth inequality increasing? 
In this paper, we examine the evidence on these three questions for the United Kingdom, 
focusing on the period from 2000 onwards. The first pre-requisite is to consider the range of 
sources of evidence about wealth-holding. There has been disagreement in the UK literature 
about the level and trend in the distribution of wealth, and this disagreement stems in part 
from the use of different sources. Section 2 summarises the main “windows” through which 
we can observe the distribution of wealth in the UK, drawing attention to their strengths and 
weaknesses. The second pre-requisite is to clarify definitions.  There is no such thing as “the” 
distribution of wealth. A figure for the share of the top 1 per cent could relate to the top 1 per 
cent of households, or of families, or of individuals.  The share could relate to wealth 
excluding or including pension rights; the pension rights could include state pensions or be 
limited to private pensions. The 1 per cent could be limited to residents or could include those 
non-domiciled.  Section 3 of the paper sets out some of the key definitional issues. Having 
cleared the ground, we examine in Section 4 the light that existing evidence casts on the 
answers to the three key questions posed in the previous paragraph. This examination leads 
us to identify important ways in which there needs to be investment in improving the 
informational base about wealth-holding in the UK. The main conclusions are summarised in 
Section 5. 
 
 
 
III Working paper 4                                            F. Alvaredo, A.B. Atkinson and S. Morelli 
 
5 
 
2. Different windows on wealth 
There are four main potential sources of evidence about the distribution of personal wealth 
in the UK: 
a. Administrative (tax) data on estates at death, which indirectly provide evidence 
about the wealth of the living, by applying (the inverse of) mortality multipliers 
differentiated by age, sex and wealth class; 
b. Administrative (tax) data on investment income, which indirectly provide evidence 
about the wealth of the living, by applying yield multipliers; 
c. Household surveys of personal wealth, such as the Wealth and Assets Survey 
(WAS) conducted by the Office for National Statistics (ONS);  
d. Lists of large wealth-holders, such as the Sunday Times “Rich List”, which has 
been compiled by Philip Beresford in the UK, and the Forbes List of Billionaires.1 
There are in addition synthetic estimates that draw on two or more sources, such as those of 
Credit Suisse Research Institute (2014) that combine household survey data from the WAS 
with the number of Forbes billionaires, and Vermeulen (2015), who combines extreme 
observations on the number of billionaires as well as their wealth from the Forbes List with 
the WAS data. In all cases, the evidence about the distribution of wealth has to be considered 
in relation to the external control totals for population, based on demographic data, and for 
total personal wealth.  
Each of the sources is considered below, where we summarise the methods and their main 
strengths and weaknesses. 
 
The multiplied estate data 
Estimates of the distribution of wealth based on administrative data from the taxation of the 
estates of those dying in a particular year are reached by applying the estate multiplier 
method. Estimates of the estate distribution are first obtained from a sample of the estates 
submitting an inheritance tax return.2 Subsequently, the method considers the grossed-up 
population of decedents as a sample of the living population. The death rate, however, is 
clearly not random, as it substantially varies across age, gender, social or wealth class, etc. 
One can nonetheless define death as ‘random’ within each specific age, gender, marital 
status, social or wealth class cell, and take each cell-specific mortality rate as the ‘sampling 
rate’. Their inverse (‘estate multiplier’) can be then used to re-weight the observations for 
decedents in order to obtain the distribution for the living population. Additional adjustments 
                                                          
1
 There exists a fifth potential source of evidence about the distribution of personal wealth: administrative data 
on the wealth of the living derived from personal wealth taxes. However, in the UK there is no annual wealth 
tax, and the Council Tax cannot be used for this purpose. 
2
 Namely, the estates gaining a grant of representation (known as confirmation of executors in Scotland, and 
probate or letter of administration in the rest of the United Kingdom). The estates held by younger individuals 
are oversampled, while 100% of the largest estates are included. With this procedure, estates of low value are 
generally excluded, as well as those held in trusts or in joint names passing to a surviving spouse or civil partner. 
The excluded estates accounted approximately for 70% of total estates in 2008-2010. 
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have to be made in order to control for individuals not covered by the estate tax statistics and 
total assets not represented in the estate data. 
These data on estates at death have long been used for economic research in the UK.  
Initially, they were employed to make estimates of total personal wealth. Baxter (1869) 
estimated the total wealth on the basis of the Probate Duty data, applying a multiplier of 30, 
which he took to be the cycle for each devolution of property. In terms of the distribution, such 
a single multiplier, referred to as a “unity multiplier”, means that this method yields estimates 
of the distribution of estates, not of wealth. It takes no account of the differential rates of death 
by wealth class. Following the proposal of Coghlan (in the discussion of Harris and Lake, 
1906), Mallet (1908) applied to each estate a multiplier related to age at death. These 
“general mortality multipliers” were subsequently refined in Mallet and Strutt (1915) to apply 
“social class multipliers” allowing for the lower mortality of the upper and middle classes. 
Differentiation was also made later on the basis of gender.  For many years, this has formed 
the basis for estate-based estimates of the distribution of wealth in the UK. 
Applying multipliers yields estimates of the number of individuals owning wealth in particular 
ranges and the amounts of their wealth. The next step is to relate the numbers and amounts 
to external control totals. In the latter case, the totals come from elements in the national 
balance sheets. This method was developed in Atkinson and Harrison (1978) and by the 
Inland Revenue in their (revised) Series C introduced to cover the period from 1976. The 
Series C was published on an annual basis until 2005.3  A new methodology has since been 
introduced by the HMRC (which has replaced the Inland Revenue), with estimates being 
produced for three-year averages 2001-2003, 2005-2007, and 2008-2010 (available from the 
HMRC website)4. The details of the change are discussed further in Section 4.  
The estate-based estimates have evident shortcomings.  The first, and most obvious, is that 
the estate data as such do not cover the rights to occupational or state pensions.5 The 
second, equally obvious, is that the degree of concentration of wealth is likely to be under-
stated on account of tax avoidance and evasion.  Estate planning is certainly an effective 
way to reduce tax liabilities at death. In the UK, for instance, assets given away at least seven 
years before death are not subject to estate taxation. In statistical terms, this problem is 
mitigated by the fact that the recipients are also subject to the risk of dying, and their 
multiplied-up wealth appears in the estimated wealth distribution. However, the donors are 
likely to be un-representative of their class (being less healthy) so that the mitigation is only 
partial (see Atkinson and Harrison, 1978, pages 32-33).  A second source of avoidance is 
provided by trusts (mainly discretionary trusts). Although the official Series C attempted to 
make allowance for excluded wealth in trusts, these adjustments were based on limited and 
increasingly dated information.  
                                                          
3http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120403124426/http:/www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal_wealth/ar
chive.htm. 
4
 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/distribution-of-personal-wealth-statistics. 
5Although for many years, the Inland Revenue made estimates of the distribution of wealth including 
occupational pension rights (Series D) or both occupational and state pension rights (Series E) – see for 
example Inland Revenue Statistics 1996, Tables 13.6 and 13.7. 
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Moreover, the validity of the estate multiplier method depends on the estate multipliers. The 
HMRC wealth model approximates the mortality risk of wealthy individuals with those of 
individuals living in owner-occupation taken from the ONS Longitudinal Study of social class 
and occupational mobility. This model was recently updated using the English Longitudinal 
Survey of Ageing (ELSA) to better capture the relationship between housing wealth and 
mortality.6 Similarly, Kopczuk and Saez (2004) use the mortality of US college-educated 
individuals as a proxy for that of wealthy individuals. However, Saez and Zucman (2014) 
report that this may not be a good approximation of mortality for wealthier people (above the 
90th percentile of the wealth distribution), whose mortality rate is considerably lower. They 
argue that this mortality gap has been increasing over time in the US, biasing downward the 
evolution of the estate-based wealth shares. The estate multiplier approach would clearly 
benefit from a fresh systematic investigation of mortality risk within the population according 
to social classes, income and wealth levels. 
 
The multiplied investment income data 
The investment income method has been applied to the UK by Atkinson and Harrison (1974 
and 1978, chapter 7), building on the work of Barna (1945) and Stark (1972).  The underlying 
method has been described by Saez and Zucman in their recent paper on the US as follows: 
“starting with the capital income reported by individuals to the Internal Revenue Service—
which is broken down into many categories: dividends, interest, rents, profits, mortgage 
payments, etc.—for each asset class we compute a capitalization factor that maps the total 
flow of tax income to the total amount of wealth recorded in the Flow of Funds. We then 
combine individual incomes and aggregate capitalization factors by assuming that within a 
given asset class the capitalization factor is the same for everybody. For example, if the ratio 
of Flow of Funds fixed income claims to tax reported interest income is 50, then $50,000 in 
fixed income claims is attributed to an individual reporting $1,000 in interest” (2014, page 1).  
They use the income tax data and the national balance sheets (Flow of Funds), and this may 
be contrasted with the “hybrid” investment income method used by Atkinson and Harrison, 
where the yields are taken from external sources and weighted using asset composition data 
from the estate-based wealth estimates, leading to a single capitalization factor applied to 
total investment income reported in the Survey of Personal Incomes (SPI), based on income 
tax returns. The adoption of this hybrid approach reflected the fact that the income data in 
the UK were only tabulated according to broad categories (see Atkinson and Harrison, 1978, 
page 175).  It is also the case that, where the estate-based asset composition data include 
assets that do not generate income taxable under the income tax, these can be allowed for 
in calculating the overall multiplier.  Such assets include owner-occupied houses, non-
interest-bearing bank accounts, non-taxable fixed-income claims, durable goods and 
collectibles. In contrast, Saez and Zucman make allowance for such assets making use of 
                                                          
6This represents an improvement on the ground that home-ownership can hardly identify wealth in a context of 
high and increasing home-ownership rates. However, as acknowledged by the HMRC, the data still present 
some problems to the extent that ELSA is designed to be representative of older households living in England 
only.  
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additional data sources: surveys, property tax records, etc; and they are also able to attach 
estimates of funded pension wealth. 
The theoretical basis for the investment income method and the potential bias in the 
estimation of wealth inequality are set out in Atkinson and Harrison (1978, chapter 7 and 
Appendix VII), where two main sources of error are identified: the variation with the level of 
wealth of the rates of return to individual asset types, and the variation in the rate of return 
for a given asset and wealth level (idiosyncratic returns). The US estimates of Saez and 
Zucman represent an advance in that they employ data from foundations to demonstrate that 
returns are flat within asset classes (the overall yield rises with wealth on account of asset 
composition).  In the case of the second source of error, they argue from an illustrative 
calculation that “idiosyncratic returns cannot create much bias” (2014, page 16).  The 
discussion in Atkinson and Harrison is more cautious, concluding that the upward bias in the 
measurement of wealth inequality “is large enough to be taken seriously but not sufficient to 
discredit the investment income method” (1978, page 199).  
The investment income method has considerable advantages in that the underlying data 
relate to the living population and the method does not depend on assumptions about the 
differential mortality rates by wealth classes.  Estimates employing the hybrid investment 
income method were made by Atkinson and Harrison (1978) for 1968-9 and 1972-3.  Today, 
however, it does not seem possible to satisfactorily apply the method using the currently 
available data. The SPI micro data available to public users only provide four variables 
(aggregating many different types of capital incomes): (i) dividends, (ii) income from property, 
(iii) net interest from UK banks, building societies and other deposit takers, and (iv) other 
investment income. In order to apply the full investment income method, a more detailed 
version of the SPI micro data would be necessary. The information contained in the internal 
SPI looks more promising, but at the moment of writing we have not yet obtained effective 
access to the micro-data.7 
The application of the hybrid method, as in Atkinson and Harrison (1978) could be 
contemplated, but this requires a detailed breakdown of wealth by asset types and wealth 
ranges. The published information for years 2000 onwards (Table 13.1 on the HMRC 
website) only gives six categories of assets and two of liabilities.8  Again, to apply the 
investment income method, more detailed information is required. 
In our view, the investment income method should certainly be explored further, but for this 
it is necessary that the underlying data be available in a more detailed form. 
  
                                                          
7
 This explains why, at this stage, we do not provide results based on the investment income method in section 
4. 
8
 Table 13.1 on the HMRC website at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120403124426/http:/www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal_wealth/arc
hive.htm. 
III Working paper 4                                            F. Alvaredo, A.B. Atkinson and S. Morelli 
 
9 
 
Household surveys 
Household surveys are a quite different source of data, unaffected by problems of tax 
avoidance and tax evasion because unrelated to the operation of the tax system, and able to 
furnish information about pension entitlements. These surveys date back in the UK to the 
Oxford Savings Surveys in the 1950s (see Atkinson and Harrison, 1978, Appendix I).  In the 
1970s, the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth investigated the 
possible role of sample surveys of wealth-holding, commissioning two small pilot surveys, 
but concluded that the results, “notably the particularly low response rate (around 50 per 
cent)” did not justify the launching of a full-scale survey (1979, page 117).  
 
More recently, attitudes towards household surveys have changed.  The British Household 
Panel Study (BHPS) began collecting data on financial wealth in 1995. In 2000, the Office for 
National Statistics began to plan the longitudinal Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS), which 
was launched in 2006, funded by a consortium which also included (in 2012) the Department 
for Work and Pensions, HMRC, the Financial Conduct Authority, and the Scottish 
Government (Official for National Statistics, 2012). The first WAS spanned the period 2006-
2008, and subsequent waves have covered 2008-2010 (Wave 2), 2010-2012 (Wave 3) and 
2012-2014 (Wave 4, full results not yet published), covering only Great Britain.  
Does the renewed interest in household survey data on wealth reflect a resolution of the 
problem of low response rates?  This does not appear to be the case. Wave 1 of WAS in 
2006-2008 achieved a response rate of 54.6 per cent – similar to that found in the 1970s.  
Since the WAS is a longitudinal survey, the calculation of the combined response rate over 
successive waves is not straightforward, as the ONS attempts to re-contact previous wave 
non-contacts and movers (household splitting) between waves. Figure 1 shows the absolute 
number of households eligible at each stage and the number co-operating.  Waves 2 and 3 
achieved higher response rates among those eligible, but this still left a final total of only 
15,517 households, compared with an initial eligible sample in of 55,835 in Wave 1. Wave 3 
included a new “booster” sample, with a response rate of 50.8 per cent.  
A low rate of response does not necessarily imply that the results on wealth shares are 
biased. On the other hand, there are a priori reasons to expect there to be differential non-
response by wealth classes. The feasibility studies in the 1970s found that “the indications 
were that non-response would be higher among those groups with higher incomes and 
substantial investment income” (ONS, 2009, page 2).  In order to mitigate this effect, the 
WAS made use of information available from the income tax records to flag addresses where 
at least one person was likely to have total financial wealth above a certain threshold, and 
these flagged addresses had a higher (2½ or 3 times) chance of selection (ONS, 2009, page 
119).  However, the evidence gathered in Vermuelen (2015) suggests that the oversampling 
strategy has not been very effective. There were also problems of incomplete response.  In 
the case of business assets, “a high percentage of those who said they held business assets 
failed to provide an estimate of the value of such assets” (ONS, 2009, page 5). This led to 
business assets being excluded from the estimates of total wealth. This omission is likely to 
be particularly important in the upper wealth ranges. 
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The issues of non-response and under-reporting at the top mean, in our view, that the Wealth 
and Assets Survey -valuable as it in covering the majority of the population- cannot, on its 
own, provide a fully satisfactory representation of the upper tail of the UK wealth distribution. 
Figure 1: Eligible and co-operating households in each WAS wave  
Source: Data provided by ONS. 
 
The Rich Lists 
Since 1989, the Sunday Times has published annually in April a “Rich List” of the wealthiest 
people or families in Great Britain. The Lists, compiled by Philip Beresford, appear as a 
supplement to the newspaper, and on occasion in extended book form (Beresford, 1990, 
1991 and 2006). The methods used in constructing the Lists are set out in “Rules of 
engagement" (for example, page 91 of the Sunday Times Magazine, 18 May, 2014).  The 
description emphasises that the estimates are “the minimum wealth … the actual size of their 
fortunes may be much larger”.  The construction of the list draws on a wide range of public 
information, coming from a variety of sources.  The estimates relate to identifiable wealth, 
such as land, property, art, or significant shares in publicly quoted companies, and in recent 
years have paid particular attention to liabilities (for example, where shares are used as 
collateral for loans). 
UK top wealth-holders are also included in the global Forbes List of (Dollar) Billionaires, 
published annually by the business magazine since 1987. The list is compiled by reporters 
who “meet with the list candidates and their handlers and interview employees, rivals, 
attorneys and security analysts. … We do attempt to vet these numbers with all billionaires. 
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Some cooperate, others don’t” (Dolan, 2012).  Nonetheless, it is not easy to validate the 
information. 
In summary, the rich lists provide valuable insight into the upper tail of the wealth distribution, 
but it is not easy to assess their representativeness. 
 
Total personal wealth 
The shares of top wealth-holders depend on the control total for personal wealth. In the early 
part of the period with which we are concerned here, the HMRC provided a reconciliation of 
the wealth totals that is of central importance in understanding the estimates of wealth shares 
(Table 13.4 in HMRC statistics).9  This is particularly useful to control for the individuals as 
well as the total assets not represented within the estate data (“excluded wealth”). 
The reconciliation begins with the total net wealth identified in the multiplied-up estate data 
(“identified wealth”), which was £3,432 billion in 2005, as shown in appendix table, column 5.  
The first stage involves adjustment for under-recording and differences in valuation in the 
estate data (for example, replacing the maturity value of a life assurance policy by its equity 
value). This increases the total in 2005 to £4,097 billion.  To this is added the estimated value 
of the so called “excluded wealth”, namely that wealth not subject to estate taxation as well 
as the wealth of those not covered by the estate data. The so-called “excluded wealth” 
includes estimates of joint properties, small properties and trusts. The resulting total is £5,005 
billion in 2005, and this is defined as “Series C marketable wealth”. The total is 46 per cent 
higher than “identified wealth”. 
The Series C total marketable wealth may be compared with the total sector (S.14 and S.15 
combined) wealth in the national accounts balance sheets.  There are significant definitional 
differences. The first is that the national accounts combine households with non-profit 
institutions serving households (NPISH); the second is that the national accounts balance 
sheets are defined on an end-of-year basis.  The most important difference, however, is the 
inclusion in the national accounts total of the value of funded pension rights (£1,213 billion in 
2005).  The aggregate value of all pension rights, funded and unfunded, occupational and 
state, is given as £2,999 billion in 2005.  
It is evident that the adjustments to the estate data, and whether or not pension wealth is 
included, make a significant difference to the control totals employed. 
 
3. Inequality of what among whom? 
The paper is concerned with the distribution of personal wealth, by which we mean the value 
of the total assets owned (directly or indirectly) by individuals, net of their debts. Assets 
include financial assets, such as bank accounts, stocks or bonds, and real assets, such as 
                                                          
9http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120403124426/http:/www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal_wealth/ar
chive.htm. 
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houses, business assets and consumer durables. As defined here, it does not include 
“human capital” (the capitalized value of future earnings).  
The implementation of this concept does however raise a number of definitional issues, and 
these are resolved in different ways in different sources of evidence.  
Geographical scope. First, there is the geographical scope. The estimates discussed here 
relate either to the United Kingdom (tax-based estimates) or to Great Britain (the WAS 
household survey), the latter excluding Northern Ireland.  Northern Ireland accounts for 2.8 
per cent of the UK total resident population. However, the Sunday Times Rich List has a 
different approach. It includes people who live and work in Britain, and people who are 
married to Britons, who have strong links with Britain, who have estates and other assets 
there, or who have backed British political parties, British institutions and British charities.  It 
includes British citizens abroad.  The population represented is therefore more extensive 
than that in the estate-based estimates, or investment income data, or the WAS household 
surveys. 
Unit of analysis. Secondly, the unit of analysis in the case of the estate-based estimates and 
the investment income-based estimates is the individual10.  Estates are naturally recorded 
on the death of an individual.  Since 1990, the income tax has been levied on an individual 
basis, and hence the investment income data take this form. In contrast, the WAS survey 
data relate to the total wealth of the household, defined as a person or a group of people 
(family members and nonrelatives) living together in the same dwelling.11  In the case of the 
Rich Lists, the unit may be more extensive than the household. For example, in the 2014 
Sunday Times list, the top entry was the Hinduja Brothers; third was Lakshmi Mittal and 
family, which includes his son and daughter; the wealth of number 11 includes Galen Weston, 
his wife and his nephew, George Weston.  There are often multiple generations, such as 
number 19 (Earl Cadogan and his son, Viscount Chelsea). 
What difference does the unit of analysis make to the estimated wealth shares?  How can 
we compare the estate-based estimates of individual wealth with the household wealth 
estimates in the WAS? If we treat all units as weighted equally (so no account is taken of 
household size), then the control total for households is smaller than that for individuals (by 
a factor 1/h, less than 1, where h is the average number of adults per household). In 2010 in 
the UK the value of h is close to 2, and we take that value in the illustrative examples below. 
The impact of moving from an individual to a household basis depends on the joint distribution 
of wealth.  Suppose first that in the top 1 per cent of individuals each person is married to 
someone with equal wealth. They then constitute the top 1 per cent of households (since h = 
2), and have the same share of total wealth.  On the other hand, to the extent that the top 1 
                                                          
10
 This may clearly vary across countries depending on the nature of the tax unit. In the US for instance a tax 
unit is similar to a family unit as it contains singles or married couples with or without dependants. Therefore 
the estimates of top wealth shares for the US by Saez and Zucman (2014) based on the capitalization method 
relate to tax units and not to individuals. 
11
 Notwithstanding this, the WAS aims to follow individuals rather than households. In the case that a household 
splits, with individuals living at different addresses, WAS interviews all of the original sample members in the 
next wave of the survey (ONS, 2014).  
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per cent marry out of that group, the household-based share of total wealth is reduced. 
Similarly, if the top 1 per cent of individuals are all single, then they account for 2 per cent of 
total households, and the share of the top 1 per cent is reduced, compared to that measured 
on an individual basis. The calculations in Atkinson and Harrison (1978, page 248) suggest 
that, in the limiting cases of all single, or of rich married to poor, the share of the top 1 per 
cent could be reduced by 4 to 5 percentage points when moving from the individual to the 
household distribution. In practice, the household-based estimates are likely to be lower but 
by less than this amount. 
Method of valuation. A third set of definitional issues concerns the method of valuation, a 
topic that is often taken for granted. As the ONS says of national balance sheets, the wealth 
figures are taken to represent the “market value of the financial and non-financial assets”, but 
the application of the market value approach raises a number of issues. Life assurance 
policies provide an illustration. This asset changes value on death: the maturity value 
recorded in the estate exceeds the value to the person alive. For this reason, the HMRC in 
its Series C made adjustments. But the market value, in terms of what the policy would fetch 
if surrendered, falls short of the continuing value to the person. In Atkinson and Harrison 
(1978, page 5), we distinguish between “realisation” and “going concern” valuations.  
Interpreted as what a person could realize by the sale of all assets, net of liabilities, the former 
coincides in principle, with exceptions such as life policies, with the value placed on an estate 
at death. The going concern valuation, however, could well be considerably higher. That 
there can be a significant difference may be seen from the example of household contents 
(durables, furniture, etc.), where the price obtained on sale is likely to fall considerably short 
of the value to a continuing household (or the replacement cost). A less common, but 
important, example of differences between realisation and going concern valuations is that 
of family businesses.  Finally, there is the case of pension rights, where the realisation value 
may be zero, but they are of considerable value to a living person.  The standard approach 
to handling these differences is by the exclusion or inclusion of classes of assets. The current 
HMRC estate-based estimates exclude pension rights (private and state). The WAS 
estimates both include and exclude pension rights.  The WAS estimates also exclude 
business assets.  It seems however preferable to adopt explicitly either a realisation or a 
going concern basis.  
 
4. Wealth shares in the UK since 2000 
We discuss in turn the different sources of evidence about the distribution of wealth in the UK 
and the conclusions that can be drawn about the three questions posed at the start of the 
paper. As noted above, no results are given using the investment income method, since we 
do not yet have access to the necessary data. 
Estate-data-based estimates 
We begin with HMRC Series C, which cover the years from 2000 to 2005 (excluding 2004). 
The shares of the top 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent are shown in Figure 2 and 3, 
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and in Table 1.  The published data also include the share of the top 50 per cent, top 25 per 
cent and top 2 per cent; they do not break down the top 1 per cent.  
The Series C ended in 2005. HMRC Commentary (2012) explains the main changes in 
methodology in the new estimates, replacing Series C.  The most important are the move to 
producing estimates based on data averaged over three years, the most recent being 2008-
2010, in order to reduce sampling variation, and the adoption of new multipliers based on the 
variation of mortality with housing wealth.12  On the other hand, HMRC have dropped the 
adjustments made in Series C for the excluded wealth, for valuation, and to a balance sheet 
basis, focusing exclusively on the identified wealth. The link with the national balance sheets 
has been broken, making very difficult the estimation of the total personal wealth for these 
years.  Their reasons for dropping these adjustments are described as follows. 
“These adjustments were not based on robust data, and used operational adjustments or 
assumptions instead. We do not know how accurate these adjustments are or if they should 
be changing over time. The data on Adjusted and Marketable Wealth is sensitive to these 
assumptions and so it was decided that this data was not robust enough for us to continue 
to publish it” (HMRC, 2012, page 17). 
These concerns are understandable.  For example, the Inland Revenue Statistics 2000 
describes how the estimate of excluded wealth in trusts was based on studies for two years 
(1976 and 1988) which were by then distant in time. Although small in total, the addition 
would be largely allocated to the upper wealth groups.  A significant investment would no 
doubt have been required to bring the estimate up to date.  It is however regrettable that such 
an investment, and investments in other elements, were not given priority, and that, as a 
result, the estimates of the wealth distribution are now less complete. 
The “new HMRC estimates” (HMRC website, 2012, Table 13.1) show the numbers and total 
wealth of individuals by ranges of net unadjusted wealth.13 In particular the estimated wealth 
is not corrected for potential underreporting and undervaluation as was done for Series C 
data.  The same data are also presented in the form of decile shares, but these are of little 
interest since they relate only to those identified as wealth-holders (in 2008-2010, only 31 per 
cent of the total population aged 18 and over) and only to identified wealth.  In order to render 
the estimates closer to those for earlier years, we have made two adjustments. First, we have 
expressed the numbers as a percentage of the total population aged 18 and over.  Second, 
we have taken as the control total for wealth the sum of identified wealth plus excluded wealth 
as estimated by HMRC (Table 13.4), where this includes an estimate of the wealth of the 
                                                          
12
 The next update covering the period from 2011 to 2013 was scheduled for publication in September 2015. 
However, as we write, the HMRC is proposing not to publish these or any further updates. The reason being 
that they “do not think that the HMRC Personal Wealth National Statistics, which are based on data from 
Inheritance Tax returns for estates requiring probate, can be reliably used to look at the distribution of wealth 
amongst all people in the UK” (HMRC, 2015, p. 4). There are indeed limitations to the estate-based estimates, 
as we have noted above, and as has been extensively discussed in the literature over more than a century (a 
literature to which the Inland Revenue, the predecessor of HMRC, has been a major contributor). But, as we 
have emphasized, other sources of data on wealth-holding have significant limitations regarding the coverage 
of top wealth-holders. 
13
 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/447352/table_13-1.pdf. 
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excluded population.  This procedure is applied up to 2005, the last year for which the HMRC 
reconciliation exercise has been published, and for subsequent years is extrapolated in line 
with total personal wealth as estimated in the UK balance sheet.14 The results are the 
estimates ‘derived from HMRC new series’ shown in Table 1.  
Comparing the estimates in Figures 2 and 3 for the overlapping period 2001-2003, we can 
see that the new HMRC estimates are, as we would expect, lower than the earlier Series C 
estimates. The share of the top 1 per cent is 3.1 percentage points lower. It should be noted 
that there is a considerable margin of error around our estimated control total. Series C, 
indeed, cannot be directly compared to the new assembled series from the HMRC due to the 
lack of adjustments for wealth valuations. 
 
Figure 2: Estimates of the top 10% wealth shares since 2000 
 
Figure 3: Estimates of the top 1% wealth shares since 2000 
                                                          
14
 Blue Book 2014, S1HN-LE-B90: total net worth of household and NPISH. 
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What do the estate-based estimates tell us about the three questions with which we began? 
First, they indicate that the distribution of wealth in the UK is highly concentrated. The top 1 
per cent own between one fifth and one quarter of total personal wealth. For instance, adding 
3.1 percentage points to the estimate for 2008-2010 gives a figure roughly comparable to 
those for Series C of 23.5 per cent for the share of the top 1 per cent.  
Secondly, if we take the estimates in Table 1, then the share of the top 1 per cent in total net 
worth (of individuals) is around double the share of the top 1 per cent (again, of individuals) 
in total net income (income after deducting income tax), which in the first half of the 2000s 
was around 10 per cent.15  The share of the top 10 per cent in total wealth was at that time 
about 50 per cent higher than their share in total net income.  Of course, the top x per cent 
of wealth-holders are not necessarily the same people as the top x per cent of income-
recipients. 
Thirdly, there is some indication that the top shares in wealth were increasing between 2001-
2003 and 2008-2010 but this may depend on the estimation of the wealth control total which 
is now subject to higher uncertainty as explained above. We would therefore be cautious 
about drawing any firm conclusion in view of the need for a more robustly established control 
total for wealth. 
                                                          
15
 The shares of the top 10, top 5 and top 1% of net income are provided in Appendix Table A. The numbers 
are different from those appearing in the World Top Incomes Database (WTID) simply due to the different 
definition of the population control total: adults aged 18 and over in this paper (for consistency with the wealth 
distribution estimates), and adults aged 15 and over in the WTID. 
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Table 1: Estimates of Top Wealth Shares 
  
HMRC series C   Derived from HMRC new series   
ONS WAS for 
OECD   
ONS WAS for 
OECD including 
pension wealth 
  
Credit 
Suisse   Vermeulen 
 
top 
10% 
top 
5% 
top 
1%  
top 
10% 
top 
5% 
top 
1%  
top 
10% 
top 
5% 
top 
1%  
top 
10% 
top 
5% 
top 
1%  
top 
10% 
top 
1%  
top 5% 
L 
bound 
top 5% 
U 
bound 
top 1% 
L 
bound 
top 1% U bound 
 
per cent 
                                           
2000 56.0 44.0 23.0              51.5 20.5      
2001 54.0 41.0 22.0              51.6 20.5      
2002 54.0 41.0 21.0  50.4 37.5 17.9          51.6 20.6      
2003 53.0 40.0 19.0              51.7 20.7      
2004                 51.7 20.8      
2005 54.0 40.0 21.0              51.9 20.8      
2006     51.5 38.2 19.7          51.9 20.9      
2007         42.1 29.4 12.2  38.9 26.3 10.0  52.0 21.0      
2008                 52.1 21.1      
2009     53.7 40.1 20.4  43.4 30.8 14.0  40.0 26.9 10.6  52.4 21.4  31.0 35.0 14.0 18.0 
2010                 52.8 21.8      
2011         46.6 34.2 17.5  40.3 28.0 12.7  53.1 22.2      
2012                 53.5 22.6      
2013                 53.6 22.8      
2014                 54.1 23.3      
                                                
Sources and Notes: 
HMRC series C: HMRC website, Distribution of Personal Wealth, Table 13.5 Distribution among the adult population of marketable wealth (Series 
C),http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120403124426/http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal_wealth/13-5-table-2005.pdf Derived from HMRC new series: 
estimated from HMRC Table 13.1 Identified Personal Wealth, as explained in the text. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/447352/table_13-1.pdfONS WAS for OECD: estimates provided by the ONS to the 
OECD Wealth Database.Credit Suisse: Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2014, Global Wealth Databook 2014, London.Vermeulen (2015): “How fat is the top tail of 
the wealth distribution?”, unpublished working paper. Vermeulen's top wealth shares derived uniquely from the WAS (before any combination with Forbes' rich list) 
are: 30% for the top 5%, and 13% for the top 1%. 
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Household survey-based estimates 
The introduction of the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) provides a new and independent 
source of evidence about the distribution of wealth in Great Britain (i.e. the UK excluding 
Northern Ireland).  Figures 2 and 3 show the estimated shares of the top 1 and 10 per cent 
as supplied to the OECD by the ONS for the three periods covered (in each case shown at 
the mid-point year: i.e. 2007 for 2006-8).  These shares relate to household wealth (each 
household weighted as 1), and are shown including and excluding pension rights (the latter 
data for 2010-12 are included in the OECD Wealth Distribution Database, labelled 2012).  
The first finding is that, in the case of the overlapping period 2008-2010, the WAS estimates 
excluding pension wealth suggest a share of the top 10 or top 1 per cent that is considerably 
below the estate-based estimates: 43 per cent for the top 10 per cent, compared with 53.7 
per cent, and 14 per cent for the top 1 per cent, compared with 20 per cent. We have to take 
account of the fact that these estimates are household-based and that the geographic 
coverage differs, but the difference is larger than could be explained in this way. Moreover, 
if pension wealth is included, then the gap is even wider.  The share of the top 1 per cent is 
only 11 per cent, or virtually half that found in the estate-based estimates. If the share of the  
top 1 per cent were as low as 11 per cent, then we had to revisit the conclusion that wealth 
is much more unequally distributed than income: the share of the top 1 per cent in after tax 
income in 2009-2010 averaged 10.7 per cent. 
These estimates for the Great Britain are compared by the OECD with estimates for other 
countries based on sample surveys.  It is interesting to begin with an earlier such comparison: 
that between Great Britain and the United States (US) based on household surveys in the 
1950s (Lydall and Lansing, 1959). This found that the distribution of wealth was significantly 
more unequal in Britain.  Sixty years later, the OECD figures show that the reverse is the 
case: the share of the top 1 per cent in the US in 2010 is 36.6 per cent, or more than double 
the UK figure for 2009.16  This dramatic change warrants further investigation, as does the 
fact that the top 1 per cent wealth share in Great Britain is so much lower (even leaving aside 
pensions) than in Austria and Netherlands (both 24 per cent) and Germany (25 per cent). 
The second finding is that the WAS-based estimates supplied by the ONS to the OECD show 
a distinct upward trend. The share of the top 1 per cent in 2010-2012 is 2.7 percentage points 
higher than in 2006-2008, when measured including pension wealth, and the increase is 
nearly double (5.3 percentage points) for the estimates excluding pension wealth.  Such a 
striking conclusion also needs to be investigated further.  
Combined with the rich lists 
The OECD refer to the problems with studying the upper tail of the wealth distribution using 
household surveys: “measuring wealth at the top of the wealth distribution through household 
surveys is intrinsically difficult, as wealthy households typically under-report their wealth [and] 
household surveys suffer from varying degrees of non-response [the] bias is particularly large 
                                                          
16
 Cowell (2013, page 44) draws attention to the “surprising” finding from the earlier BHPS survey in 2000 that 
the UK exhibits less wealth inequality than the US, Canada and Sweden.  
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when looking at the top 1% of the distribution” (2015, page 251).  This has led to attempts to 
use independent data from rich lists to “complete” the survey data. Vermeulen (2015) has 
combined extreme wealth observations from the Forbes list of World Billionaires with the 
WAS data for 2008-2010. He begins by noting “there is a substantial gap between the highest 
ranked survey household and the lowest ranked Forbes individual” (2014, page 17).  Fitting 
a Pareto upper tail, he finds that the share of the top 1 per cent rises by between 1 and 5 
percentage points, depending on the threshold assumed for the Pareto distribution.17 The 
higher end of this range would go some way towards closing the gap between the household 
survey estimates and those for individual wealth-holding based on the estate data for 2008-
2010. At the same time, we should note that those identified in the Forbes List may include 
people who are not UK residents. 
A Pareto extrapolation had earlier been used by Davies and Shorrocks in the estimates they 
have prepared for Credit Suisse (see for example Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2014, 
page 9, which describes the way in which their method has changed over time).  In effect, 
they use the total number of billionaires (but not their wealth) reported in the Forbes List to fit 
a Pareto distribution.  It is the changing number of billionaires that drives the year-to-year 
changes shown in Figures 2 and 3 (the dashed series), since the distribution is otherwise 
based on the WAS 2006-2008. As may be seen, their estimates suggest that the share of the 
top 1 per cent is close to the estate-based estimates, and the share has increased by some 
3 percentage points over the period 2000 to 2014.  
The rich lists provide information on the shape of the upper tail of the wealth distribution that 
allows for a more detailed investigation of the distribution within the top 1 per cent.  To date, 
official estimates of wealth concentration have not shown shares for groups smaller than the 
top 1 per cent (the same limitation applied to the findings in Atkinson and Harrison, 1978).   
The Sunday Times Rich List for 2010 headline has 1,000 people with £335.5 billion. These 
make up 0.004 per cent of total (GB) households and 5.3 per cent of total WAS non-pension 
wealth.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have used evidence from existing data sources to attempt to answer the 
three questions set out at the beginning and to identify the need for further information.  The 
UK wealth distribution is indeed highly concentrated. The estate-based estimates (the former 
HMRC Series C, the unadjusted estimates and the new HMRC estimates, allowing for the 
under-statement of concentration) suggest that the share of the top 1 per cent is between a 
fifth and a quarter of total personal wealth. The household survey data cannot be used on 
their own to investigate concentration at the top. When combined with information about the 
upper tail, the survey-based estimates (excluding pension wealth) are below the estate-
based estimates of top shares, but we have to allow for the fact that the estimates relate to 
households rather than individuals. On the basis of the estate-based estimates, wealth 
                                                          
17
 See also Cowell (2013) on fitting a Pareto distribution to household survey data, in this case data from the 
Luxembourg Wealth Study. 
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inequality at the top exceeds inequality in after-tax income: the share of the top 1 per cent in 
total wealth is about double the share of the top 1 per cent in after-tax income. Finally, the 
estimates provide some support for the view that wealth inequality increased in the UK over 
the first decade of the present century, but we believe that any definitive statement should 
await further investigation.  
Indeed, the evidence about the UK distribution of wealth post-2000 is seriously incomplete 
and the main conclusion of the paper is that significant investment is necessary if we are to 
provide satisfactory answers to the three questions. Moreover, given the limitations of each 
of the different sources, it is important to make use of all available approaches. The estate-
based estimates remain in our view an essential element when studying top wealth-holdings 
(and we do not believe that the HMRC official estimates should be discontinued as currently 
proposed), but there needs to be a renewed investigation of the mortality multipliers, the 
necessary adjustments, and of the reconciliation with the balance sheet information. The 
investment income method should be explored further, but for this it is necessary that the 
underlying data be available in a more detailed form. The issues of non-response and under-
reporting at the top mean that the household surveys – valuable though they are in covering 
the majority of the population – need to be supplemented when considering the upper tail.  
Consideration needs to be given to the use of investment income data for this purpose, in 
addition to the rich lists. These recommendations require resources, but unless such work is 
undertaken we shall not be able to draw firm conclusions about the extent of wealth 
concentration, how it compares with other countries, and whether it is increasing over time. 
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Appendix: Table A 
  
Top 1% income 
share - net of 
income tax 
  
Adult 
population   Wealth aggregates 
 
top 
10% 
top 
5% 
top 
1%  
aged 18 
years  old 
and over 
 
Identified 
wealth 
Wealth 
adjustment 
for under-
recording and 
differences in 
valuation 
Excluded 
wealth 
Identified 
plus 
excluded 
wealth 
HMRC Series 
C marketable 
wealth 
National 
Accounts 
Balance sheet 
for S.14 and 
S.15 
Ratio 
marketable/balance 
sheet wealth 
Wealth total 
used for the 
estimates 
derived from 
HMRC new 
series 
 
%  thousand  billion £ billion £ billion £  billion £ billion £ % billion £ 
 
[1] [2] [3]  [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8]=[5]+[7] [9]=[5]+[6]+[7] [10] [11]=100*[9]/[10] [12] 
                           
2000 36.1 24.3 10.6  
         
45,480   
      
2,201  
               
183  
           
738  
             
2,939               3,122  
               
4,822  64.8 
               
2,939  
2001 36.4 24.3 10.5  
         
45,756   
      
2,481  
               
181  
           
802  
             
3,283               3,464  
               
4,792  72.3 
               
3,283  
2002 36.0 23.9 10.2  
         
46,048   
      
2,623  
               
222  
           
846  
             
3,469               3,691  
               
5,127  72.0 
               
3,469  
2003 36.4 24.3 10.4  
         
46,354   
      
2,839  
               
263  
           
948  
             
3,787               4,050  
               
5,503  73.6 
               
3,787  
2004 36.0 24.1 10.5  
         
46,689        
               
5,962       
2005 36.4 24.8 11.2  
         
47,163   
      
3,432  
               
665  
           
908  
             
4,340               5,005  
               
6,376  78.5 
               
4,340  
2006 36.8 25.4 11.8  
         
47,592        
               
6,771   
               
4,634  
2007 37.4 26.1 12.3  
         
48,043        
               
7,204   
               
4,931  
2008     
         
48,499        
               
6,574   
               
4,500  
2009 36.5 25.3 12.2  
         
48,910        
               
6,968   
               
4,769  
2010 32.7 21.9 9.2  
         
49,371        
               
7,517   
               
5,145  
2011 33.5 22.5 9.4  
         
49,839        
               
7,906   
               
5,411  
2012 33.1 22.2 9.3  
         
50,180        
               
8,240   
               
5,640  
                              
 
